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We discuss potential transitions of six climatic subsystems with large-scale6
impact on Europe, sometimes denoted as tipping elements. These are the ice7
sheets on Greenland and West Antarctica, the Atlantic thermohaline circulation,8
Arctic sea ice, Alpine glaciers and northern hemisphere stratospheric ozone. Each9
system is represented by co-authors actively publishing in the corresponding field.10
For each subsystem we summarize the mechanism of a potential transition in a11
warmer climate along with its impact on Europe and assess the likelihood for such12
transition based on published scientific literature. For summary, the ’tipping’13
potential for each systems is provided as a function of global mean temperature14
increase which required some subjective interpretation of scientific facts by the15
authors and should be considered as a snapshot of our current understanding.16
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1. General concept of tipping elements17
Definition of tipping elements for the paper In this review we follow the formal definition of18
tipping elements given by Lenton et al. (2008), which was formulated less rigorously for the19
Synthesis Report of the IARU Congress on climate change (Richardson et al., 2009). For all20
practical purposes the following concise formulation, which we will adopt for this paper, is21
sufficient.22
23
“Tipping elements are regional-scale features of the climate that could exhibit a threshold24
behaviour in response to climate change - that is, a small shift in background climate can25
trigger a large-scale shift towards a qualitatively different state of the system."26
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Figure 1 Potential tipping elements with direct impact on Europe as discussed in this paper.
It should be noted that this definition includes the possibility of irreversible shifts and27
multiple stable states of a system for the same background climate (so-called hysteresis28
behaviour as illustrated in figure 2). It is, however, not restricted to these.29
Role of self-amplification for tipping elements The word tipping element suggests the existence30
of a self-amplification process at the heart of the tipping dynamics. Once triggered it31
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dominates the dynamics for a certain period of time and thereby induces a qualitative change32
within the system, e.g. from an ice-covered to an ice-free Arctic. If existent, understanding33
the self-amplification process is crucial to prevent tipping. A prominent example of such34
self-amplification is the ice-albedo feedback (figure 2) that is discussed to be operational in35
the Arctic sea-ice region and on mountain glaciers such as the Alps and the Himalayas: An36
initial warming of snow- or ice-covered area induces regional melting. This uncovers darker37
ground, either brownish land or blue ocean, beneath the white snow- or ice-cover. Darker38
surfaces reflect less sunlight inducing increased regional warming1- the effect self-amplifies.
is to the Arctic with summer sea-ice loss likely to occur long
before (and potentially contribute to) GIS melt. Tipping ele-
ments in the tropics, the boreal zone, and West Antarctica are
surrounded by large uncertainty and, given their potential
sensitivity, constitute candidates for surprising society. The
archetypal example of a tipping element, the THC appears to be
a less immediate threat, but the long-term fate of the THC under
significant warming remains a source of concern (99).
The Prospects for Early Warning
Establishing early warning systems for various tipping elements
would clearly be desirable, but can crit be anticipated before we
reach it? In principle, an incipient bifurcation in a dynamical
system could be anticipated (100), by looking at the spectral
properties of time series data (101), in particular, extracting the
longest system-immanent timescale () from the response of the
system to natural variability (102). Systems theory reveals (Fig.
2A) (i) that those tipping points that represent a bifurcation are
universally characterized by 3  at the threshold, and (ii) that
in principle  could be reconstructed through methods of time
series analysis. Hence a ‘‘degenerate fingerprinting’’ method has
been developed for anticipating a threshold in a spatially ex-
tended system and applied to the detection of a threshold in the
Atlantic THC, by using time series output from a model of
intermediate complexity (102) (Fig. 2B).
These studies reveal that if a system is forced slowly (keeping
it in quasi-equilibrium), proximity to a threshold may be inferred
in a model-independent way. However, if the system is forced
faster (as is probably the case for the THC today), a dynamical
model will also be needed. Even if there is no bifurcation,
determining  is still worthwhile because it determines the
system’s linear response characteristics to external forcing, and
transitions that are not strictly bifurcations are expected to
resemble bifurcation-type behavior to a certain degree. For
strongly resource-limited ecosystems that show self-organized
patchiness, their observable macrostructure may also provide an
indication of their proximity to state changes (103).
If a forewarning system for approaching thresholds is to
become workable, then real-time observation systems need to
be improved (e.g., building on the Atlantic THC monitoring at
26.5°N). For slow transition systems, notably ocean and ice
sheets, observation records also need to be extended further
back in time (e.g., for the Atlantic beyond the 150-year SST
record). Analysis of extended time series data could then be
used to improve models (104), e.g., an effort to determine the
Atlantic’s  and assimilate it into ocean models could reduce
the vast intra- and intermodel (44) spread regarding the
proximity to a tipping point (102).
Conclusion
Society may be lulled into a false sense of security by smooth
projections of global change. Our synthesis of present knowledge
suggests that a variety of tipping elements could reach their
critical point within this century under anthropogenic climate
change. The greatest threats are tipping the Arctic sea-ice and
the Greenland ice sheet, and at least five other elements could
surprise us by exhibiting a nearby tipping point. This knowledge
should influence climate policy, but a full assessment of policy
relevance would require that, for each potential tipping element,
we answer the following questions: Mitigation: Can we stay clear
of crit? Adaptation: Can Fˆ be tolerated?
The IPCC provides a thorough overview of mitigation (105)
and adaptation (106) work upon which such a policy assess-
ment of tipping elements could be built. Given the scale of
potential impacts from tipping elements, we anticipate that
they will shift the balance toward stronger mitigation and
demand adaptation concepts beyond incremental approaches
(107, 108). Policy analysis and implementation will be ex-
tremely challenging given the nonconvexities in the human-
environment system (109) that will be enhanced by tipping
elements, as well as the need to handle intergenerational
justice and interpersonal equity over long periods and under
conditions of uncertainty (110). A rigorous study of potential
tipping elements in human socioeconomic systems would also
be welcome, especially to address whether and how a rapid
societal transition toward sustainability could be triggered,
given that some models suggest there exists a tipping point for
the transition to a low-carbon-energy system (111).
It seems wise to assume that we have not yet identified all
potential policy-relevant tipping elements. Hence, a systematic
search for further tipping elements should be undertaken,
drawing on both paleodata and multimodel ensemble studies.
Given the large uncertainty that remains about tipping ele-
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Fig. 2. Method for estimating theproximity to a tippingpoint. (A) Schematic
approach: The potential wells represent stable attractors, and the ball, the
state of the system. Under gradual anthropogenic forcing (progressing from
dark to light blue potential), the right potential well becomes shallower and
finally vanishes (threshold), causing the ball to abruptly roll to the left. The
curvature of the well is inversely proportional to the system’s response time 
to small perturbations. ‘‘Degenerate fingerprinting’’ (102) extracts  from the
system’s noisy, multivariate time series and forecasts the vanishing of local
curvature. (B) Degeneratefingerprinting ‘‘in action’’: Shown is an example for
theAtlanticmeridional overturning circulation. (Upper)Overturning strength
under a 4-fold linear increase of atmospheric CO2 over 50,000 years in the
CLIMBER-2 model with weak, stochastic freshwater forcing. Eventually, the
circulation collapses without early warning. (Lower) Overturning replaced by
a proxy of the shape of the potential (as in A). Although the signal is noisier
in Lower than it is in Upper, it allows forecasting of the location of the
threshold (data taken from ref. 102). The solid green line is a linear fit, and the
dashed green lines are 95% error bars.
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Figure 2 Left: Schematic illustrating the tipping of a system (Lenton et al., 2008). Initially
(front), the system (dark orange ball) is stable within its background climate (blue
valley). Initial changes in background climate do not alter the ball’s position (or
system’s state). At a certain threshold small changes cause the ball to roll over.
The system is tipping into a qualitatively different state. Right: The ice-albedo
feedback as an example of self-amplification which is at the heart of most tipping
elements. A plus between two processes denotes an enhancing influence; a minus
denotes reduction. For example, increased temperature reduces ice cover. An even
number of minuses yields a self-amplification loop (denoted by ’+’ in the center of
the loop).
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Here, following Lenton et al. (2008), the tipping of a system is not defined through such40
self- mplificatio , but rather through the ratio of small external perturbation to strong41
system’s respons . Such a definition does not comprise any dynamic element. This is42
justified especially from some stakeholders’ perspective (Lenton et al., 2009) which are43
mainly interested in whether a region will undergo exceptionally strong climate-related44
changes. For the example of the Arctic summer sea ice, we describe below that it is currently45
not clear whether the Arctic sea ice decline shows signs of internal acceleration. From the46
stakeholders’ perspective, however, internal self-amplification is of secondary importance47
as lo g as the process is abrupt. F r local communities as well as Arctic ecosystems it is48
1 The phrase ice-albedo feedback is commonly used and refers to the changing reflectivity or albedo of the
surface.
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more important that the sea ice is declining rapidly and that summer sea ice will most likely49
vanish for a further warming of 1-2◦C.50
As mentioned above, in this paper, we adopt the stakeholders’ perspective and define51
tipping elements through a strong response to small external perturbations. The authors52
emphasize however that a dynamical perspective might better reflect the public perception of53
the word tipping element and thus the dynamical perspective will be emphasized whenever it54
is applicable. In order to minimize any possible misconception, we adopt the term transition55
as a synonym for the term ’tipping’ as defined by (Lenton et al., 2008).56
Structure of the paper and selection of tipping elements In the following sections, six different57
’tipping elements of the climate system’ with direct relevance for Europe are discussed58
(figure 1). Even though we can not claim completeness, the tipping elements discussed were59
selected and sorted according to the severity of their direct impact on Europe. It is important60
to note that a number of global tipping elements might have indirect effect on Europe possibly61
through a major disturbance of the climate system or migration of climate-change-induced62
refugees. The Himalayan glaciers, for example, store water which is released into the rivers63
of India, China and neighbouring countries. Current water supply during the dry season in64
these countries with more than two billion inhabitants depends on this storage mechanism.65
Comparable to other mountain glaciers the Himalayas are vulnerable to global warming66
through, for example, the albedo-feedback described in section 5. Similarly important,67
monsoon systems in India, Asia and Africa support the livelihood of hundreds of million68
of people by providing precipitation for regional agriculture. Since monsoon circulations69
are sustained by a self-amplification process, they might show abrupt cessation (Levermann70
et al., 2009). Although monsoon rainfall in Asia seems to have undergone abrupt transitions71
in the past (Wang et al., 2008), their tipping potentials has not been evaluated and no robust72
assessment can be given at this point.73
Other processes might further amplify global warming and thereby affect also Europe. An74
example of a tipping element with such characteristic is thawing of northern hemispheric75
permafrost (Lashof, 1989). The associated biological activity induces the release of methane76
and carbon dioxide from the ground. These are greenhouse gases and currently represent77
the two strongest anthropogenic contribution to global warming. The release per degree of78
global warming depends on a number of regional biological factors and is difficult to assess79
but poses a potential source of additional warming. Current assessments suggest that the80
self-amplification is, however, small (Stendel & Christensen, 2002, Lawrence & Slater, 2005).81
In this review we focused on tipping elements with direct impact on Europe. It is important82
to note that we do not seek a comprehensive assessment of the systems but restrict the83
discussion to a potential transition into a qualitatively different state. Consequently, each84
section briefly describes the potential tipping element and the impacts of such a transition,85
followed by an explanation of the associated self-amplification process and a brief assessment86
of its tipping potential. We conclude with a comparison of tipping potentials and linkages87
between different systems.88
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2. Ice sheets on Greenland (GIS) & West Antarctica (WAIS)89
Current sea level contribution and potential future impact on Europe Most European coast90
line protection was initially built for the last century’s sea level conditions and has mainly91
been readjusted moderately since. Though the situation may strongly differ from region to92
region, the maximum height to which dykes may be elevated rarely exceeds 1 m. Beyond93
this region-specific threshold significant rebuilding is necessary to protect land against storm94
surges and flooding. Most coastlines can not be protected against sea level rise of several95
meters. Therefore it is important to assess the potential for rapid sea level rise (SLR)96
within this century and beyond due to accelerated melt of the large ice sheets on Greenland97
and Antarctica.98
Global warming of about 0.7◦±0.1◦C during the last century has increased global sea level99
by about 0.15-0.2 m (Church & White, 2006). Mountain glaciers and ice caps (MGIC) were100
responsible for about 0.05 m of SLR during 20th century. A similar contribution was due101
to oceanic thermal expansion. A possible source for the missing 0.05-0.10 m are the large102
ice sheets on Greenland and Antarctica. Direct observational data are, however, extremely103
limited prior to the 1970s. In the last 10-15 years this has changed. It has now been shown104
that both the Greenland Ice Sheet (GIS) and the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) have been105
losing mass and this loss has been accelerating (Velicogna, 2009). During this period, the106
much larger East Antarctic Ice Sheet (EAIS) has been approximately in balance (Rignot et al.,107
2008). These changes in ice sheet behaviour are recent and rapid and were not predicted by108
any of the current generation of ice sheet models. As a consequence, the Intergovernmental109
Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) suggested only modest contributions from the large ice110
sheets in its fourth assessment report in 2007 (Meehl et al., 2007). Already the observed sea111
level rise between 1990 and 2006 was underestimated by about 40% (Rahmstorf et al., 2007).112
It was acknowledged in the report that ice sheet processes were not adequately incorporated113
into projected sea level rise due to the inadequacy of the current generation of models. As114
a result, the projected global SLR of 0.20 - 0.60 m by 2100 underestimates the potential115
contribution of the ice sheets. A semi-empirical approach that links temperature increase116
above pre-industrial with the rate of sea level change yields much wider uncertainty for the117
respective IPCC scenarios in 2100 of 0.50 - 1.40 m (Rahmstorf, 2007).118
In recent years (since the mid 1990s) Antarctica exhibits net ice loss and is currently119
contributing about as much to global SLR as Greenland (Velicogna, 2009). An assessment of120
the potential contribution of the great ice sheets within this century is the subject of intense121
research efforts. The water stored in GIS is sufficient to raise global sea level by about 7 m.122
Although WAIS contains enough ice to increase global sea level by approximately 5 m, only123
about 3 m SLR equivalent are subject to potential self-amplifying ice discharge because they124
are grounded below the current sea surface (Bamber et al., 2009). The East Antarctic Ice125
Sheet could raise sea level by another ∼50 m. Even though also in East Antarctica large126
areas of bedrock are below sea level evidence for the possibility of abrupt discharge there is127
not established.128
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During the last glacial period (about 20 thousand years ago) large water masses were129
stored in ice sheets on the Northern Hemisphere. Furthermore colder ocean water was130
contracted and sea level was about 120-130 m below present levels. About 3 million years131
ago, global temperatures were higher than presently observed and reconstructions of past132
sea level show an elevation of 20-30 m above that seen today. Even higher temperatures133
40 million years ago were associated with even higher levels of about 60-70 m above present134
levels. Despite large uncertainty it is clear that, in the past, sea level has responded to135
temperature changes of a few degrees by sea surface elevations of the order of tens of meters.136
These changes might have occurred in steps and not gradually and over long periods of time.137
The most recent period that was warmer than the present was the last interglacial, known as138
the Eemian, from 130-115 thousand years before present. During this period, sea level was139
at least 4-6 m higher than today and summer temperatures were 3-6◦C warmer (CAPE-Last140
Interglaicial Project Members, 2006, Sime et al., 2009). Thus, it is evident that there is a141
profound difference between the equilibrium response of sea level to temperature and the142
transient, centennial to millennial, response that is important here.143
Consequently current projections of SLR for the 21st century are one to two orders of144
magnitude smaller than the expected equilibrium response of SLR for the same temperature145
derived from paleodata. This is due to strong inertia in the system which causes sea level146
response to temperature changes to be relatively slow but also long lasting. The question147
is: How quickly can sea level rise in response to rapid temperature increase? Due to their148
potentially self-amplifying ice loss mechanisms, GIS and WAIS are particularly important in149
a risk assessment of future SLR. Mass loss of an ice sheet is not just associated with more150
water in the ocean. Loss of big ice masses affects Earth’s gravitational field and thereby151
regional sea level. For example, the loss of the GIS reduces the gravitational pull into the152
North Atlantic, hence lowering sea levels and offsetting SLR in that region but enhancing153
SLR in other regions. As a consequence the water distribution within the oceans is changed154
which alters the sea level pattern. Figure 3 shows the combined effects of additional water155
and associated gravitational effects for GIS and WAIS. Northern European coastlines will156
thus be less affected by mass loss in Greenland, while a reduction in WAIS leads to even157
stronger sea level rise on the European and North American coast compared to the global158
mean. There are, however, also shorter-term effects related to ocean dynamics that may159
also lead to large regional variations in sea level rise and which are superimposed on any160
gravitationally driven changes (Yin et al., 2009, Stammer, 2008, Levermann et al., 2005).161
Mechanism: Self-amplifying ice loss from Greenland GIS covers most of Greenland and reaches162
a thickness of up to 3500 m. Since atmospheric temperatures decline with altitude1, GIS’s163
highly elevated surface is significantly colder than it would be at sea level. This gives rise to164
1 On average temperatures decline by about 7◦C for each kilometre altitude. Locally and temporarily
this ’lapse rate’ depends on weather conditions, but its order of magnitude is a robust feature which is
fundamentally linked to Earth’s gravity.
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Global sea level is an indicator of climate change1±3, as it is
sensitive to both thermal expansion of the oceans and a reduction
of land-based glaciers. Global sea-level rise has been estimated by
correcting observations from tide gauges for glacial isostatic
adjustmentÐthe continuing sea-level response due to melting
of Late Pleistocene iceÐand by computing the global mean of
these residual trends4±9. In such analyses, spatial patterns of sea-
level rise are assumed to be signals that will average out over
geographically distributed tide-gauge data. But a long history
of modelling studies10±12 has demonstrated that non-uniformÐ
that is, non-eustaticÐsea-level redistributions can be produced
by variations in the volume of the polar ice sheets. Here we present
numerical predictions of gravitationally consistent patterns of
sea-level change following variations in either the Antarctic or
Greenland ice sheets or the melting of a suite of small mountain
glaciers. These predictions are characterized by geometrically
distinct patterns that reconcile spatial variations in previously
published sea-level records. Under theÐalbeit coarseÐassump-
tion of a globally uniform thermal expansion of the oceans, our
approach suggests melting of the Greenland ice complex over the
last century equivalent to ,0.6 mm yr-1 of sea-level rise.
Gravitationally self-consistent sea-level changes arising from the
growth or ablation of ice masses have been of interest for more than
a century10±12. Woodward10 demonstrated that the melting of an ice
mass on a rigid Earth would lead to a highly non-uniform sea-level
redistribution as a consequence of self-gravitation in the surface
load. Indeed, sea level on a rigid Earth will drop within ,208 of a
localized (point mass) ice melting event12. The sea-level theory was
extended to include elastic deformations of the solid Earth (ref. 11
and others), culminating in the `sea-level equation' derived and
solved by Farrell and Clark12.
We have computed sea-level redistributions associated with
present-day mass variations in the Antarctic and Greenland ice
complexes as well as melting from a suite of smaller land-based ice
sheets and glaciers tabulated by Meier13. Our calculations are based
on a new sea-level theory14 that extends earlier work12 to include a
varying shoreline geometry and the in¯uence of load-induced
perturbations in the Earth's rotation vector. As we are concerned
with sea-level variations associated with relatively rapid ice ¯ux
scenarios, we adopt a form of the theory suitable for an elastic Earth.
The elastic and density structure of the model are adopted from
PREM15.
Meier's sources13 combine to provide a `eustatic' sea-level rise of
00.100.200.300.400.500.600.700.800.901.001.101.20
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Figure 1 Predicted geometries of sea-level change due to continuing ice mass variations.
Normalized global sea-level variations were computed for the case of present-day ice
mass variations in a, Antarctica, b, Greenland and c, melting of the mounting glaciers and
ice sheets tabulated by Meier13. In a and b we assume that the mass variation is uniform
over the two polar regions. The results are normalized by the equivalent eustatic sea-level
change for each mass ¯ux event (see text). Departures from a contour value of 1.0 re¯ect
departures from the assumption that the sea-level distribution accompanying these mass
¯ux events is uniform. Predictions are based on a new sea-level theory14 solved using a
pseudo-spectral algorithm14,29 with truncation at spherical harmonic degree and order
512. This truncation corresponds to a spatial resolution of 40 km.
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Figure 3 Regional distribution to sea level rise from (a) West Antarctic Ice Sheet, (b)
Greenland Ice Sheet (GIS) and (c) mountain glaciers. Regional heterogeneity arises
from g vitational effects and slight changes in Earth rotatio . Actual sea level rise
in m ters is obtained by multiplication of values in p nel a with ∼3.5 (Bamber
et al., 2009) nd values in panel b with ∼7 m. Figure from (Mi rovica et al., 2001)
a potential self-amplification process: If GIS loses ice, its surface elevation is lowered and165
7
its surface temperature increased. This enhances ice loss through melting and possibly the166
acceleration of iceberg discharge (surface-elevation-feedback).
Figure 4 GIS melting area shows strong variations from year to year with some underlying
trend towards larger areas of melting (left). Since 1979 with the first available
satellite images of the region, the largest melting area was observed during the
warmest year on record, 2005, while the smallest melting area was recorded in
1992 after the Mount Pinatubo volcanic eruption (right). Figures from K. Steffen,
University of Colorado, USA.
167
Assessment of tipping potential for Greenland Ice Sheet (GIS) It is important to note that168
due to the surface-elevation-feedback, simulations suggest that GIS would not regrow under169
present climate conditions once it is eliminated and that its present existence is a relict170
of the last glacial period (Toniazzo et al., 2004, Ridley et al., 2010). From a stakeholder’s171
perspective the relevant question, however, is whether there is a critical threshold temperature172
at which a complete disintegration of GIS is certain. In 2007, the IPCC-AR4 estimates this173
threshold to be 4.5± 0.9◦C of warming over Greenland. Due to enhanced warming in high174
northern latitudes (figure 8) the associated range in global mean temperature is slightly lower175
(estimated to 3.1± 0.8◦C by Gregory & Huybrechts (2006)) and depends on the rapidity of176
Arctic sea-ice retreat (section 4) as well as atmospheric dynamics that contribute to polar177
amplification of the anthropogenic warming signal. The IPCC-AR4 states that this threshold178
could be crossed within this century.179
This estimate is, however, based on the so-called Positive-Degree-Day (PDD) approach,180
which employs an empirical relationship between surface melting and surface temperature.181
This parameterization needs to be calibrated using presently observed climatic conditions and182
it is questionable whether such calibration is valid for strongly altered boundary conditions183
as in a markedly warmer climate. More physically based energy-balance models tend to184
have a reduced sensitivity of the surface mass balance to increasing temperatures which185
might shift future threshold estimates towards higher values. Nonetheless, it is certain that186
increased temperatures in the Arctic will result in increased mass loss from the GIS. What is187
8
less certain is the temperature at which the fate of the ice sheet is sealed. There is currently188
no evidence from model simulations or observational data that suggest that a near-complete189
disintegration might occur quicker than on a millennial time scale even for quite extreme190
warming scenarios (Ridley et al., 2005).191
Land ice models are currently not able to capture observed acceleration of ice streams on192
GIS as for example the doubling in ice speed in the fastest flowing ice stream in Jakobshavn193
Isbrae (Joughin et al., 2004). Due to difficulties of current state-of-the-art models to simulate194
fast ice flow processes, models are likely to underestimate GIS sea level contribution of this195
century. Consequently scientists have employed a different approach to estimating the GIS196
sea level contribution within this century. Avoiding model simulations, Pfeffer et al. (2008)197
estimated the maximum contribution of GIS to global SLR as constrained by the maximum198
ice speed possible and the width of potential ice discharge outlets, to 0.54 m within this199
century.
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he recent report from the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) (1) highlights the improved
accuracy of measurements of current sea-
level rise, as well as greater certainty in the
projected impacts of global warming on non-
polar glaciers and thermal expansion of the
oceans. These advances heighten confi-
dence in projections of the most predictable
components of sea-level rise, but the IPCC’s
projections specifically exclude the contribu-
tion that could arise from rapidly changing
flow in ice sheets, especially in Greenland and
West Antarctica. Why does so much uncer-
tainty surround the future of ice sheets and
their impact on sea-level rise?
Compared with the coupled ocean-atmo-
sphere climate system, an ice sheet might
seem a rather simple system to model numer-
ically. Ice sheets are composed of a single,
largely homogeneous material. Their viscous
flow is governed by the Navier-Stokes equa-
tion formulated in the mid-19th century. They
move so slowly that turbulence, Coriolis, and
other inertial effects can be ignored. Stresses
within the ice are handled well in the latest
generation of ice sheet models (2). It is in
specifying the stress boundary conditions on
two of the ice sheet interfaces—its base and its
seaward margin—that the difficulty arises. 
At the base of the ice sheet, the stress
resisting ice flow can vary by orders of magni-
tude, depending on the pressure of subglacial
meltwater and the slipperiness of sediments.
The transience and complexity of water
flow beneath ice streams is only now
becoming apparent (3). At the basal bound-
ary, interactions among water flow, friction,
sediment deformation, and heat flow be-
come so intertwined that calculating the
resistive stress from first principles tests the
ingenuity of glaciologists. Nor is it certain
that the basal boundary condition will remain
constant on the decadal to centennial time
scales that are of interest to the IPCC, espe-
cially in Greenland, where meltwater can
flood through crevasses to lubricate the base
of the ice sheet (4).
At the margin of the ice sheet, the ice
begins to float, interacts with the ocean, and
eventually calves into icebergs. This boundary
controls whether the ice sheet is stable to
perturbations, induced perhaps by warmer
oceans or atmosph re. Early theories sug-
gested that the location of the margin ight be
unstable enough that a small perturbation
could trigger runaway retreat inland (see the
figure) (5). Since then, glaciologists
have debated whether such extreme
behavior could really occur. A new
boundary-layer theory for coastal ice
shows the way forward (6). This theory
still needs to be incorporated into
large-scale ice sheet models, but early
indications are that the instability
highlighted by earlier theories should
be taken seriously. 
Recent observations of widespread
acceleration of glaciers draining the
Greenland Ice Sheet have brought our
uncertainty in specifying these bound-
ary conditions to prominence. Green-
land appears capable of responding to
changing atmospheric and ocean con-
ditions around its margins much faster
than expected (7–9). The immediate
challenge for modelers is to improve
the description of the basal and terminal
processes such that these changes can
be reproduced in model simulations.
This is a substantial task, but it is made
more feasible by the observations of
change that reveal the time scales of
response [see also the accompanying
Perspective by Truffer and Fahnestock (10)],
and it provides a superb opportunity to test
whether the processes we expect to be impor-
tant are correctly represented in the models.
In recent years, many changes have also
been observed in West Antarctica: thinning
and loss of buttressing ice shelves, accelerat-
ing glacier flow, thinning of the seaward por-
tion of many glaciers in the region, and inland
retreat of the point at which the ice begins to
float. The latest theoretical advances have done
nothing to allay fears concerning the potential
instability of marine ice sheets (6) (see the fig-
ure). Determining whether small changes
could really trigger substantial deglaciation is
complicated enough. To compound this, there
are no clear-cut records of marine ice sheet
deglaciation for comparison, either on Earth
today or in the geological record.
There have probably been many marine ice
sheet deglaciations during the glacial cycles of
e past 2 million years, but the geological
record was bulldozed away as the ice sheets
subsequently readvanced. Only the record of
the last deglaciation, since about 18,000 years
ago, remains intact. This deglaciation caused
two periods of global sea-level rise at rates far
higher than those projected by the IPCC (2).
However, most of that rise resulted from non-
marine ice sheets, and the sea-level curve on
its own does not tell us to what extent marine
ice sheets are unstable. Indeed, there is still
major uncertainty as to how much of the West
Antarctic Ice Sheet survived in recent inter-
glacial periods that were globally warmer than
today and that are the best analog for future
greenhouse warming. In the absence of a suf-
ficiently well-documented example of marine
ice sheet retreat, hypotheses of instability
could be missing important processes that
limit the rate or extent of retreat, or conversely,
Ice sheet behavior is strongly influenced by
processes at its margin and base. Observations
of rapid changes at these boundaries are
helpi g modelers to improve predictions of
future changes.
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Concerns about stability. The ice sheet covering West
Antarctica is the last great marine ice sheet. Its bed lies below
sea level and slopes down inland from the coast. The profile
shown is based on Thwaites Glacier, West Antarctica (11). In
the top panel, the ice sheet is in equilibrium; influx from
snowfall (q) is balanced by outflow. A small retreat (lower
panel) will provoke changes in both the influx and the out-
flow. If these changes act to promote further retreat, the ice
margin is unstable.
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Figure 5 Tipping of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS). Possible self-amplification process
of WAIS discharg (schematic from Vaughan & Arthern (2007)). For regions in which
the ice sheet is grounded below sea ev l ic flow across the grounding line (dashed
vertical line) gr ws with ice thicknes . If the ed is sloping down, ice discharge may
self-accelerate.
200
Mechanism: Self-amplifying ice loss from West Antarctica Low temperatures in Antarctica201
inhibit ice-sheet melting and ice loss predominantly occurs (99%) through discharge across the202
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so-called grounding line into ice shelves1. Ice shelves are floating ice masses of several hundred203
meters thickness which are subject to oceanic melting and refreezing, as well as calving into204
icebergs. Most bedrock beneath the WAIS is below current sea level. For such situations205
(figure 5), theoretical considerations suggest that ice flow through the grounding line increases206
with ice thickness (Weertman, 1974, Schoof, 2007b). Since bedrock is sloping down landward207
from the coastline in most of West Antarctica, this may lead to self-amplification: A retreat208
of the grounding line shifts its position towards regions of greater ice thickness. This enhances209
ice flow through the grounding line and yields a thinning of the still grounded ice which210
causes further retreat of the grounding line.211
Assessment of tipping potential for West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) WAIS has collapsed212
at least once during the Quaternary, over the last 750 thousand years. The most likely213
period for a collapse is around 400 thousand years before present during a particularly warm214
interglacial (Scherer et al., 1998). Simulations in combination with paleo records suggest that215
a collapse took place several times during a period of prolonged warming about 3 million216
years ago (Pollard & Deconto, 2009, Naish et al., 2009). During these periods Antarctica, as217
a whole, contributed to global SLR by about 7m within a time interval of 1000-7000 years.218
For a complete collapse of the WAIS it would be necessary to largely remove the biggest ice219
shelves in Antarctica: the Filchner-Ronne and Ross. These buttress much of the vulnerable220
inland ice and regional warming of 5◦C or more may be required to achieve this (Pollard &221
Deconto, 2009). A partial collapse or retreat of the WAIS is, however, also possible and recent222
observations from satellites support theoretical analysis of how this might occur (Rignot,223
1998). Particularly glaciers in the Amundsen Sea sector show strong thinning, a retreat of224
the grounding line (Rignot, 1998) and strong mass loss (Rignot et al., 2008), indicating the225
possibility that a partial disintegration might have been initiated. The ice volume associated226
with this region of WAIS is equivalent to a global sea surface elevation of about 1.5 m.227
Recent observations in West Antarctica between 1992 and 1998 show a fast grounding-line228
retreat of the Pine Island Glacier of 1.2 ± 0.3 km (Rignot, 1998), and an equally rapid229
grounding-line retreat (1.4± 0.2 km) and mass loss of the Thwaites Glacier (Rignot, 2001,230
Rignot et al., 2002) between 1992 and 1998 (figure 6). Dynamic thinning along ice margins231
has been observed for most of the West Antarctic coast line (Pritchard et al., 2009) that232
is consistent with what would be expected in the case of grounding line instability. An233
integrated assessment of the risk of a WAIS collapse is currently not available. An estimate234
of a maximum contribution to global SLR from WAIS using the same approach as for GIS235
(Pfeffer et al., 2008) is questionable since outlet glaciers are less constrained by topography236
in Antarctica compared to Greenland and thus discharge is potentially quicker than on237
Greenland.238
1 The grounding line is the position at which land ice starts to float, i.e. at the grounding line the grounded
ice sheet becomes floating ice shelf. Since the melting of floating ice does not raise sea level, it is the ice
flow across the grounding line that matters for global sea level rise.
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Figure 1 Ice velocity of Antarctica colour coded on a logarithmic scale and overlaid on a MODIS mosaic13. Circles denote mass loss (red) or gain (blue) of large basins
in gigatonnes per year. Drainage basins are black lines extending from the grounding-line flux gates. Letters A–K′ indicate large basins20. Ice velocities for Siple Coast ice
streams and Ronne Ice Shelf are from refs 22,23. See Supplementary Information for acronyms and the Methods section for velocity precision.
Solid-ice fluxes are then calculated combining vector ice velocity
and ice thickness, with a precision that is glacier dependent and
ranges from 2 to 15% (see the Supplementary Information). The
end points of the selected flux gates define the extent of the glacier
drainage basins determined from the DEM. Individual drainage
basins are grouped into large units labelled A to K′.
Snowfall accumulation is from the RACMO2/ANT regional
atmospheric climate model, at 55 km resolution, averaged for
1980–2004 (refs 17–19). Lateral forcings are taken from European
Center for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting reanalyses
(ERA-40) for the period 1980–2002, supplemented with European
Center for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting operational
analyses after August 2002. Comparisons with 1,900 independent
field data show excellent agreement (R= 0.82) with the model18.
The model predicts higher coastal precipitation and wetter
conditions in West Antarctica and the western Peninsula17 than
older maps obtained by interpolating limited field data using
meteorological variables20 or satellite passive microwave data21.
Few reliable in situ coastal accumulation data exist for comparison,
but in the high-accumulation sector of the Getz Ice Shelf (basin
F′G), the model predicts precipitation levels consistent with a
2,030mmyr−1 record at Russkaya station (74◦46′ S, 136◦52′ W)
for 1981–1989. Older maps yield accumulation levels 3 times lower,
which imply a local mass balance 20 times more negative and high
rates of glacier thinning that are not observed2. The RACMO2/ANT
accumulation values yield comparable losses for Pine Island and
Thwaites glaciers, which is consistent with the similarity of their
thinning rates2; other maps yield twice more thinning for Thwaites.
Finally, the model does not mix data from different time periods
and fully incorporates temporal changes in snowfall between 1980
and 2004. A statistical analysis of absolute errors (see the Methods
section) yields an uncertainty in accumulation varying from 10%
in dry, large basins to 30% in wet, small coastal basins.
Ice flux and snowfall are compared for each glacier, for large
basins A–K′, and for the Peninsula, East and West Antarctica. To
include non-surveyed areas, we apply a scaling factor on the mass
fluxes of each large basin A–K′ based on the percentage surveyed
area versus total area to cover 100% of Antarctica (Table 1). In East
Antarctica, we obtain a near-zero mass balance of −4±61Gt yr−1.
The J′′K Filchner22 and E′E Ross sectors are gaining mass, but this
is compensated by the mass loss in Wilkes Land (basin CE) from
the Philippi, Denman, Totten, Moscow University Ice Shelf, Cook
Ice Shelf and David glaciers. Interestingly, all of these glaciers are
marine based, that is, grounded well below sea level2, and therefore
nature geoscience VOL 1 FEBRUARY 2008 www.nature.com/naturegeoscience 107
Figure 6 Ice discharge along the West Antarctic coast has increased by more than 50% in 10
y ars (Rignot et al., 2008). Red dots indicat mass loss, blue dots mass gain.
3. Atlantic thermohaline circula i n (THC)239
Potential impact on Europe The Atlantic thermohaline circulation (THC) is a large-scale240
ocean conveyor-belt circulati n which transports about 1 PW =1015W of heat towards241
the Nordic Seas (Ganachaud & Wunsch, 2000) and thereby contributes to milder winters242
in northern Europe compared to regions of similar latitudes in North America and Asia.243
Without this heat transport (figure 7) the Nordic Seas would be about 8◦C cooler, and244
northern Europe, depending on atmospheric conditions and latitude, would be several degrees245
co ler than at prese t (Vellinga & Wood, 2002). Europe would suffer from significant drying246
and r duced precipitation. W s e ly winds would hift southward with reduced winds in247
the northern part and increased winds in the southern half of Europe (L urian et al., 2010).248
Furthermore, simulations suggest that a THC collapse would increase sea level around249
European coast lines by up to 1m (Levermann et al., 2005). This regional contribution250
would add on to global SLR and could be ten times quicker than presently observed rates,251
depending on the rapidity of the oceanic circulation changes.252
In addition to these regional changes, the global climate system would be significantly253
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perturbed by a THC collapse. Oceanic uptake of heat and carbon dioxide could strongly254
decrease and thereby accelerate global warming. Atlantic ecosystems are likely to be disrupted255
(Schmittner, 2005, Kuhlbrodt et al., 2009) and the tropical rain belt would shift by several256
hundred kilometres southward in the Atlantic sector affecting populated areas in West Africa257
and the Amazon rain forest (Stouffer et al., 2006). Reconstructions of past climate suggest258
far reaching influences on the Asian monsoon system (Goswami et al., 2006).259
Figure 7 A collapse of the Atlantic Thermohaline Circulation (THC) would have severe global
consequences. Left: Temperatures in the Nordic Seas would drop by up to 8◦C.
Depending on atmospheric transport this yields several degrees of cooling in Europe
(figure from Vellinga & Wood (2002)). Right: In addition to global SLR due to
warming, sea level would rise by up to 1m along the European and North American
coast (figure from Levermann et al. (2005)).
Mechanism: Self-amplified slow-down of THC The Achilles heel of the THC is deep water260
formation in the North Atlantic which is an essential component of the circulation. The261
density of North Atlantic water determines the strength of deep water formation and thereby262
of the THC. In the North Atlantic densification occurs through heat loss and salinity inflow263
which is partly provided by the circulation itself through import from the south. An initial264
reduction of the circulation thus reduces salinity transport to the north and further weakens265
the circulation (Rahmstorf, 1996). Through the release of salt during sea ice formation (brine266
rejection) there is a strong link of the North Atlantic salinity budget to Arctic winter sea ice267
extent.268
Assessment of THC tipping potential There are three lines of scientific reasoning on which269
the risk of a THC collapse is based. First, if the THC does indeed transport salt to the North270
Atlantic, the associated self-amplification process is based on robust large-scale features of271
the circulation and it is likely to have a significant influence. Observational data suggest that272
the present-day THC does transport salt into the Atlantic basin (Rahmstorf, 1996, Weijer273
et al., 1999). Secondly, rapid reorganizations of the North Atlantic ocean circulation have274
occurred during the last glacial period (McManus et al., 2004). These were associated with275
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strong global climatic disruptions (Rahmstorf, 2002, Clark et al., 2002) and occurred on276
decadal to centennial time scales. Freshwater fluxes that caused past circulation changes277
have been estimated (Ganopolski & Rahmstorf, 2001) to be of the order of expected melt278
water contributions from Greenland (Huybrechts et al., 2004) and potential future changes279
in North Atlantic precipitation (Miller & Russell, 2000, Winguth et al., 2005). It is, however,280
possible that stability properties of the Atlantic overturning are different under glacial and281
interglacial boundary conditions (Ganopolski & Rahmstorf, 2001, Weber & Drijfhout, 2007).282
Thirdly, a variety of coupled climate models at different levels of complexity have shown283
abrupt THC collapse in response to systematically increased artificial Atlantic freshwater284
forcing (Rahmstorf et al., 2005). More complex and thus computationally less efficient285
models which were used for the IPCC-AR4 future projections are not able to perform this286
kind of systematic analysis. In these models a less systematic approach has been taken in287
order to assess the stability properties of the THC (Stouffer et al., 2006). Freshwater was288
externally applied for a period of one hundred years which forces a THC collapse. The289
cessation of the freshwater flux led to a resumption of the circulation in all of these models.290
Furthermore none of the IPCC-AR4 models show a THC cessation even for the strongest291
global warming scenarios (Gregory et al., 2005). These results seems to hold even when292
taking GIS melt water inflow into account (Jungclaus et al., 2006).293
One needs to keep in mind that this does not prove that the models do not have two stable294
states. Neither is it certain that the models properly represent stability properties of the real295
ocean. In fact Weber et al. (2007) showed that while in the real ocean the THC transports296
salt into the Atlantic basin, this is not the case in all of these models. Thus state-of-the-art297
models seem to have a bias towards mono-stability (Hofmann & Rahmstorf, 2009). Under298
global warming scenarios, all IPCC AR4 models, for which salt and freshwater fluxes are299
available, show an increased salt import into the Atlantic, i.e. the modeled circulations are300
moving towards a potential critical threshold (Drijfhout et al., 2010).301
Furthermore, it is possible that the THC is vulnerable not only to large scale freshing of302
the North Atlantic as has been observed in recent decades (Dickson et al., 2002) potentially303
as part of a decadal oscillation (Hátún et al., 2005), but also to small-scale changes in the two304
main deep water formation regions in the central Greenland Sea and the central Labrador305
Sea. In both places open ocean convection in winter induces deep water formation in the306
region. In the Greenland Sea the process takes place in a very limited region of the gyre307
centre near 75◦N 0◦W, and was greatly assisted by the fact that the area over the site was308
covered for several months in winter by a locally-formed ice cover of pancake ice known as309
the Odden ice tongue, growing in the cold water of the Jan Mayen Polar Current which310
diverts east from the East Greenland Current. The brine retention by the ocean during311
pancake ice formation produced a negative buoyancy flux which models showed (Wilkinson312
& Wadhams, 2003) to be the major factor in inducing overturning, which took place by313
means of convective chimneys extending to 2500 m (Wadhams et al., 2002, 2004). Since 1998314
changes in the atmospheric circulation, and warming of the ocean, have caused the Odden315
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ice tongue to disappear, and this is likely to have led to a decrease in the depth and volume316
of convection. This is therefore a further self-amplified mechanism for THC slow-down and317
is a tipping point in that convection cannot return to its previous level unless winter ice318
growth of the Odden ice tongue resumes.319
An elicitation of experts on THC stability provided no clear picture on the risk of a future320
THC collapse. Subjective probabilities of different experts for triggering a breakdown within321
this century ranged from 0% - 90% (Zickfeld et al., 2007). A more recent expert elicitation322
conducted by Kriegler et al. (2009) suggests less uncertainty and a clear increase of tipping323
potential with global warming (figure 13). The IPCC AR4 assesses the probability of a THC324
collapse within this century to 10% (Jansen et al., 2007).325
Similar to the situation for WAIS also the north Atlantic circulation could exhibit a partial326
reorganization. While so-called Dansgaard-Oeschger events of the last glacial period might327
have been associated with abrupt transitions in the meridional circulation (Rahmstorf, 2002),328
also abrupt transitions in the horizontal circulation can not be ruled out (Levermann & Born,329
2007). A wealth of paleo-records for the so called 8.2K event at the beginning of the present330
interglacial can be explained by an abrupt strengthening of the north Atlantic subpolar gyre331
(Born & Levermann, 2010). In model simulations such transitions require significantly less332
external perturbation than a collapse of the Atlantic overturning circulation. While it is333
clear that there is a strong link between the meridional and the horizontal circulation, it is334
not yet established how the respective tipping mechanisms are related.335
4. Arctic sea ice336
Potential impact on Europe While global mean temperature has risen by about 0.7◦ ± 0.1◦C337
during the last century, Arctic warming has locally been two to four times higher. This polar338
amplification has a number of causes one of which is melting Arctic sea ice and associated339
surface-albedo changes (van Oldenborgh et al., 2009, Winton, 2006a). As a consequence,340
Europe has also warmed more than the global average - an effect that is going to persist341
under future increase of atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration (figure 8) and would342
accelerate during accelerated deglaciation of Arctic sea-ice cover. Although models do not343
provide a uniform picture, sea-ice retreat can influence the North Atlantic atmospheric344
pressure system and thereby the Atlantic storm track into Europe (Kattsov & Källén, 2004).345
Honda et al. (2009) have shown that strong reduction in Arctic summer sea-ice cover is346
associated with anomalously cold Eurasian winters and Petoukhov & Semenov (2010) found347
an up to three-fold increased probability of extreme cold events on northern continents in348
response to Barents-Kara sea ice reduction in winter. Furthermore, reduced sea-ice cover has349
profound impact on Arctic ecosystems. This includes marine mammals such as polar bears,350
seals, walrus and narwhales (Loeng, 2004). Strongly reduced sea-ice cover yields improved351
accessibility to the Arctic including access to potential resources of fossil fuels in the region.352
The US Geological Survey estimates that about 25% of global oil resources may be found in353
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the Arctic. The estimates are highly uncertain and the error bars range from 0% to 60%354
(http://www.usgs.gov/). However, potential recovery of these reservoirs will have significant355
environmental and geo-political implications.356
Figure 8 Polar warming amplification partially caused by sea-ice melting for two scenarios
(A1B (left) and B1 (right)). Temperature anomalies for the time period 2080–2099
compared to the period 1980–1999 were averaged over all models participating in the
IPCC AR4 (Solomon et al., 2007). (Visualisation: M. Boettinger, DKRZ, Hamburg,
Germany)
Mechanism: Self-amplification of northern sea-ice melt Possible self-amplification of Arctic357
sea-ice melt could arise from the aforementioned ice-albedo feedback (figure 2), one of four358
fundamental climatic feedbacks discussed to be responsible for enhanced global warming in359
response to increasing greenhouse gas concentrations (Soden & Held, 2006). The mechanism360
for the ice–albedo feedback is simple to understand: An initial temperature increase in high361
northern latitudes leads to melting of sea ice. As a consequence, less of the dark ocean is362
covered by highly reflective ice and snow, which leads to more absorption of sunlight at363
Earth’s surface. This in turn causes more local warming and hence more melting of ice and364
snow. This self-amplification is mainly relevant for the Arctic summer sea-ice cover, since365
high-latitudinal solar insolation is strongly reduced in winter and much of the extra ice lost366
in summer can be regained during winter.367
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Assessment of tipping potential for Arctic sea-ice cover While all IPCC models agree that368
Arctic sea ice will decline in a warmer climate, these models do not show an irreversible or369
self-amplifying meltdown of Arctic summer sea ice (Winton, 2006b). Hence, any slow down370
or even reversal of global warming will have a corresponding effect on Arctic summer sea ice371
(Notz, 2009).372
There are at least three factors which compensate the self-amplifying ice–albedo feedback373
and stabilise the Arctic sea ice cover such that its retreat is not self-amplified or irreversible:374
First, for a reduced summer sea-ice cover more open water is exposed to the atmosphere375
at the onset of winter. Because during winter ocean water is warmer than the surrounding376
sea ice, the ocean releases large amounts of heat to the atmosphere. In this way, the heat377
that has accumulated in the water in summer because of the ice–albedo feedback is released378
to the atmosphere during winter. Hence, the heat that accumulated in one summer is not379
carried over to the next summer (Tietsche et al., 2010). Second, thin ice grows much faster380
than thicker ice also because of the rapid loss of heat. Hence, after an extreme summer381
minimum the rapid growth of thin ice in winter is a stabilizing feedback that counter-acts382
the destabilizing ice-albedo feedback. Again, this resets the sea-ice extent each year and383
thereby reduces the tipping potential for Arctic summer sea ice (Eisenmann & Wettlaufer384
(2009); figure 9b). Third, in areas that become ice free during summer, the snow that falls385
at the onset of winter (when snowfall rates are highest) does not accumulate on the ice but386
simply falls into the water. Hence, snow thickness on the ice that forms late in the season387
will be greatly reduced. Since snow is a very efficient insulator, such reduced snow cover also388
allows the ice to recover somewhat during winter.389
However, these stabilising feedbacks are only functioning as long as there is still significant390
ice formation during winter. In an even warmer climate with a much reduced sea-ice cover391
also during winter, a tipping point for the loss of winter sea ice might well exist. In such392
climate, Arctic winter sea ice vanishes abruptly and thereby constitutes a qualitatively393
different tipping element (figure 9b).394
Notwithstanding the low probability for a tipping of Arctic summer sea ice in the dynamical395
sense of a self-acceleration, Arctic sea ice is currently undergoing a significant transition both396
with respect to its areal extent and to its thickness. Satellite observations show a reduction397
in ice extent of almost 50% over the last 50 years (figure 9). Also ice thickness has reduced398
significantly in past decades (Haas et al., 2008). Due to very strong interannual variability399
of sea ice extent especially in response to atmospheric pressure conditions and associated400
winds (Deser & Teng, 2008), it is difficult to assess whether the retreat of Arctic sea ice is401
currently accelerating. Sea ice in the Arctic Ocean retreated at an annually-averaged rate of402
2.8% per decade from 1979 to 1996, as measured by microwave satellites (Parkinson et al.,403
1999), which sped up to 10.1% per decade from 1996 to the record-low year in 2007 (Comiso404
et al., 2008). We do not know if this accelerated rate of loss will continue. Some IPCC AR4405
models show the most rapid decline in summer sea ice when the summer extent is roughly406
half of the preindustrial extent while others show a more linear, on average, decline (Wang407
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& Overland, 2009).408
Figure 9 Left: Observed decline in minimum Arctic sea-ice cover typically reached in mid-
September of each year (red line, in million square kilometres). The year 2007
showed an anomalously strong reduction of ∼23% compared to the previous record
in 2005. 2008 exhibited a mild recovery, but 2009 summer sea-ice extent was back
on the previous trend before 2007. IPCC model simulations of 2007 (shading)
strongly underestimated (currently observed) sea-ice decline (after (Stroeve et al.,
2007)). Right: Evolution of Arctic sea ice in response to warming simulated with
an idealized physical model (Eisenmann & Wettlaufer, 2009). The vertical axis
represents the annual mean state of the upper ocean in terms of how much energy it
would take to get to this point from an ice-free ocean that is at the freezing point.
Initially (bottom left) there is a perennial sea-ice cover (blue curve) with an annual
mean thickness of about 1.5 meters. A transition to seasonally-ice free conditions
(red curve) occurs in response to warming. At this point, cooling the climate would
cause the ice cover to grow back to its original thickness. Further warming, however,
causes the system to cross a point of no return and undergo a rapid transition
to conditions which are ice-free throughout the year (gray curve). This transition
represents an ”irreversible process”: considerable cooling would be required to get
the ice to grow again (arrows to left along upper branch of the hysteresis loop). The
stable and unstable steady-state solutions are indicated by the solid and dashed
black curves, respectively.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that the variability of Arctic sea ice extent409
is probably going to increase in a warming climate and we expect larger negative and positive410
excursions from the mean downward trend such as that observed during the record sea-ice411
minimum in 2007 (Goosse et al., 2009, Notz, 2009, Lindsay et al., 2009). During that record412
summer, minimum sea-ice extent dropped by about 23% compared to the previous record413
in 2005. Though this decline was caused by anomalous atmospheric and ocean conditions414
which can not directly be attributed to global warming (Kay et al., 2008, Perovich et al.,415
2008, Zhang et al., 2008, Ogi et al., 2008, Lindsay et al., 2009), the ice in the basin was also416
preconditioned to be quite thin due to both anomalous wind patterns in previous years and417
warming winters (Lindsay et al., 2009).418
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Data from submarines shows that the mean ice thickness in the Arctic Basin declined by419
43% between the mid 1970s and the late 1990s (Rothrock et al., 1999, Wadhams & Davis,420
2000) with a loss of nearly three-quarters of the deep pressure ridges, so that at the beginning421
of the summer season the ice cover has been thinner and therefore more susceptible to the422
enhanced summer melt brought about by atmospheric and oceanic factors. The albedo423
feedback mechanism appears to have acted in this case through the enhanced production of424
surface melt pools, which preferentially absorb radiation and can melt through to form thaw425
holes, and the easier break-up of the thinner weaker floes, both mechanisms creating open426
water which itself absorbs radiation, warms up, and speeds up the melting of existing floe427
bottoms.428
The anomalous wind patterns, particularly in the early 1990’s, caused much of the older429
ice in the basin to be exported through Fram Strait so that the area covered by multiyear430
ice is now much smaller than in previous years. Thus the average age of the ice is younger431
and the mean thickness is thinner (Maslanik et al., 2007). While ice that is less than one432
year old rarely exceeds 2m thickness, older ice grows to an average of about 3m thickness.433
Since a number of processes such as ice dynamics and ice transport through winds and ocean434
currents complicate the picture, current climate models have difficulties in capturing summer435
sea-ice evolution. Currently observed decline in Arctic sea-ice cover (figure 9) is stronger436
than simulated by any climate model that took part in the latest IPCC intercomparison437
(Stroeve et al., 2007). This shortcoming of the models is probably caused by a combination438
of very large internal variability of Arctic sea-ice extent that can lead to extreme minima439
and a lack of understanding of some underlying processes that are responsible for the recent440
sea-ice retreat. Since then models have improved and some capture sea-ice decline more441
satisfactorily (Wang & Overland, 2009). Projections are highly dependent on the greenhouse442
gas emission scenario. Under unmitigated climate change1 Holland et al. (2006) project an443
abrupt decline of Arctic summer sea ice starting around 2040 with a complete melting in444
2050. This result is supported by Smedsrud et al. (2008) using a different model. While445
model studies suggest that Arctic summer sea ice will vanish at an additional global warming446
of 1− 2◦C, winter sea-ice cover is not likely to be eliminated for a warming of less than 5◦C.447
5. Alpine glaciers448
Potential impact on Europe In concert with mountain glaciers world-wide (figure 10), glaciers449
in Europe have retreated considerably over the last 150 years (Braithwaite & Raper, 2002,450
Oerlemans, 2005, Kaser et al., 2006, Zemp et al., 2008, Cogley, 2009). According to most451
recent estimates the ice volume of glaciers in the European Alps has been reduced from about452
200-300 km3 in the year 1850 to 90 ± 30 km3 at present (Haeberli et al., 2007, Farinotti453
1 That is, greenhouse gas emissions follow the so-called business-as-usual scenario, A2, of the IPCC Special
Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES).
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et al., 2009). Shrinkage of Alpine glaciers and snow cover is reducing surface reflectivity454
and thus leads to amplified temperature increase in the region. In combination with a455
generally enhanced continental warming this contributed to the anomalously strong Alpine456
warming which was about twice as high as the global average with significant acceleration in457
recent years (Auer et al., 2006). Glaciers are perceived as a symbol for a healthy mountain458
environment. Their retreat will have strong impact on tourism in Europe (Beniston, 2003).459
Since mountain glaciers and Alpine snow cover serve as freshwater reservoirs over seasonal460
to decadal time scales, glacier wastage will affect water availability in the region, in particular461
during summer. Generally it is observed that seasonality of run-off into rivers has increased.462
That is, stronger flow has been observed in the peak flow season and reduced flow or even463
drought in the low-flow season (Arnell, 2004). Initially, snow melt and associated glacier464
retreat is projected to enhance summer flow from the Alps into European rivers. When snow465
cover and glaciers shrink, however, summer flow is projected to be strongly reduced (Hock466
et al., 2005, Huss et al., 2008). Through reduced run-off into large rivers such as Rhine and467
Rhone downstream regions will be affected. A change in hydrological regime is a robust468
feature of future projections for the European Alps (Eckhardt & Ulbrich, 2005, Zwierl &469
Bugmann, 2005) and is thereby anticipated in the IPCC 2007 assessment report (Kundzewicz470
et al., 2007). This will strongly affect hydropower production in Europe (Schaefli et al.,471
2007).
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Chapter 4 Observations: Changes in Snow, Ice and Frozen Ground
Although much local, regional and high-frequency variability 
is superimposed, the smoothed series give an apparently 
homogeneous signal. General retreat of glacier tongues started 
after 1800, with considerable mean retreat rates in all regions 
after 1850 lasting throughout the 20th century. A slow down of 
retreat between about 1970 and 1990 is more evident in the raw 
data (Oerlemans, 2005). Retreat was again generally rapid in 
the 1990s; the Atlantic and the SH curves refl ect precipitation-
driven growth and advances of glaciers in western Scandinavia 
and New Zealand during the late 1990s (Chinn et al., 2005).
Records of directly measured glacier mass balances are 
few and stretch back only to the mid-20th century. Because of 
the very intensive fi eldwork required, these records are biased 
towards logistically and morphologically ‘easy’ glaciers. 
Uncertainty in directly measured annual mass balance is typically 
±200 kg m–2 yr–1 due to measurement and analysis errors 
(Cogley, 2005). Mass balance data are archived and distributed 
by the World Glacier Monitoring Service (WGMS(ICSI-IAHS), 
various years-b). From these and from several other new and 
historical sources, quality checked time series of the annual mean 
specifi c mass balance (the total mass balance of a glacier or ice 
cap divided by its total surface area) for about 300 individual 
glaciers have been constructed, analysed and presented in three 
databases (Ohmura, 2004; Cogley, 2005; Dyurgerov and Meier, 
2005). Dyurgerov and Meier (2005) also incorporated recent 
fi ndings from repeat altimetry of glaciers and ice caps in Alaska 
(Arendt et al., 2002) and Patagonia (Rignot et al., 2003). Only a 
few individual series stretch over the entire period. From these 
statistically small samples, global estimates have been obtained 
as fi ve-year (pentadal) means by arithmetic averaging (C05a in 
Figure 4.14), area-weighted averaging (DM05 and O04) and 
spatial interpolation (C05i). Although mass balances reported 
from individual glaciers include the effect of changing glacier 
area, defi ciencies in the inventories do not allow for general 
consideration of area changes. The effect of this inaccuracy 
is considered minor. Table 4.4 summarises the data plotted in 
Figure 4.14.
The time series of globally averaged mean specifi c mass 
balance from different authors have very similar shapes despite 
some offsets in magnitude. Around 1970, mass balances were 
close to zero or slightly positive in most regions (Figure 4.15) 
and close to zero in the global mean (Figure 4.14), indicating 
near-equilibration with climate after the strong earlier mass loss. 
This gives confi dence that the glacier wastage in the late 20th 
century is essentially a response to post-1970 global warming 
(Greene, 2005). Strong mass losses are indicated for the 1940s 
but uncertainty is great since the arithmetic mean values (C05a 
in Figure 4.14) are from only a few glaciers. The most recent 
period consists of four years only (2000/2001–2003/2004) and 
does not cover all regions completely. The shortage of data from 
Alaska and Patagonia likely causes a positive bias on the area-
weighted and interpolated analyses (DM05, O04, C05i) due to 
the large ice areas in these regions. There is probably also a 
negative bias in the arithmetic mean (C05a), due to the strongly 
negative northern mid-latitudes mass balances in 2002/2003, 
particularly in the European Alps (Zemp et al., 2005). Mass loss 
rates for 1990/1991 to 2003/2004 are roughly double those for 
1960/1961 to 1989/1990 (Table 4.4).
Over the last half century, both global mean winter 
accumulation and summer melting have increased steadily 
(Ohmura, 2004; Dyurgerov and Meier, 2005; Greene, 2005). 
At least in the NH, winter accumulation and summer melting 
correlate positively with hemispheric air temperature, whereas 
the mean specifi c mass balance correlates negatively with 
hemispheric air temperature (Greene, 2005). Dyurgerov and 
Dwyer (2000) analysed time series of 21 NH glaciers and found 
a rather uniformly increased mass turnover rate, qualitatively 
consistent with moderately increased precipitation and 
substantially increased low-altitude melting. This general trend 
is also indicated for Alaska (Arendt et al., 2002), the Canadian 
Arctic Archipelago (Abdalati et al., 2004) and Patagonia 
(Rignot et al., 2003).
Regional analyses by Dyurgerov and Meier (2005) show 
strongest negative mean specifi c mass balances in Patagonia, 
the northwest USA and southwest Canada, and Alaska, with 
losses especially rapid in Patagonia and Alaska after the mid-
1990s (Figure 4.15a). A cumulative mean specifi c mass balance 
of –10 × 103 kg m–2 corresponds to a loss of 10 m of water, or 
about 11 m of ice, averaged over the glacier area; cumulative 
losses in Patagonia since 1960 are approximately 40 m of ice 
thickness averaged over the glaciers. Only Europe showed a 
mean value close to zero, with strong mass losses in the Alps 
compensated by mass gains in maritime Scandinavia until the 
end of the 20th century. High spatial variability in climate and, 
thus, in glacier variations, also exists in other large regions such 
as in the high mountains of Asia (Liu et al., 2004; Dyurgerov 
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Figure 4.13. Large-scale regional mean length variations of glacier tongues 
(Oerlemans, 2005). The raw data are all constrained to pass through zero in 1950. 
The curves shown are smoothed with the Stineman (1980) method and approxi-
mate this. Glaciers are grouped into the following regional classes: SH (tropics, New 
Zealand, Patagonia), northwest North America (mainly Canadian Rockies), Atlantic 
(South Greenland, Iceland, Jan Mayen, Svalbard, Scandinavia), European Alps and 
Asia (Caucasus and central Asia).
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Mean specific mass bal nce:
Individual glaciers
30-glacier average
30-glacier volume change
Figure 10 Left panel: Mountain glaciers are retreating globally. Large-scale regional mean
length v riations of glacier tongues (Oerlem ns, 2005). (Figure from IPCC fourth
assessment report (Solomon et al., 2007) chapter 4, p. 357., data from various
sources (reconstructions, lo g-term observ tions) extrapolat d to l rge regions).
Right panel: Cumulative mean specific mass balance of 30 Swiss glaciers and
their total cumulative volume change in the 20th century. Series for the individual
glaciers ar shown in grey. The solid red line represents the arithmetic average,
and the dash-dotted blue line the cumulative total volume change of the 30 glaciers.
Two s rt periods with mass gain nd tw periods with fast mass loss are marked.
Figure from (Huss et al., 2010). The volume loss, indicated in blue, is calculated
from multiplication of thick ess and area losses.
472
In ad i ion, thawing of Alpine permafrost will destabiliz the ground nd result in land473
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slides and debris flows that have been increasingly observed in recent years (Gruber &474
Haeberli, 2007). Although thawing of permafrost is generally a slow process, strong 20th475
century warming in the Alps has already induced a pronounced thermal anomaly down476
to about 50-70m below the surface (Harris et al., 2009, Noetzli & Gruber, 2009). During477
the last century melting of mountain glaciers worldwide contributed to about 25% of the478
observed global sea level rise (Oerlemans et al., 2007). Over the next decades it is expected479
to contribute significantly although only about 0.5 m of global SLR equivalent remain in480
mountain glaciers (Meier et al., 2007). The Alpine contribution is however small compared481
to other sources like glaciers in Alaska, Patagonia and central Asia.482
Self-amplification of Alpine glacier melt Several positive feedback mechanisms amplify the483
rate of Alpine glacier retreat: The reduction in snow- and ice covered area induces increased484
regional warming and ice melt through the ice-albedo feedback illustrated in figure 2 (Paul485
et al., 2005). Furthermore, enhanced dust accumulation on the bare ice has significantly486
decreased surface albedo leading to accelerated ice melt (Oerlemans et al., 2009). Over the487
last decades a prolongation of the melting season by one month has been inferred for glaciers488
in the European Alps, and the fraction of precipitation in the form of snow has decreased by489
more than 10% (Huss et al., 2009). Both processes have significant negative effects on glacier490
mass balance. The rapid changes in the climate system furthermore induce processes of down491
wasting of glacier tongues and collapse rather than "active" glacier retreat. This involves492
the disintegration of glacier systems into small individual parts, subglacial melting out of493
large cavities and lake formation. The protective effect of increasingly strong debris cover on494
glacier tongues cannot compensate for the above mentioned positive feedback mechanisms.495
Assessment of tipping potential for Alpine glacier melt Over the last century glaciers in the496
European Alps experienced an average annual ice thickness loss of 0.2 to 0.6 m, the best497
estimate for the century average mass balance being -0.25 to -0.35 m water equivalent per498
year (Haeberli & Hoelzle, 1995, Vincent, 2002, Hoelzle et al., 2003). Strong variability in499
time and space can be documented (Huss et al., 2010, Paul & Haeberli, 2008): Fast glacier500
mass loss comparable to present-day rates has already taken place in the 1940s and time501
periods of slightly positive mass balances with intermittent glacier readvance are documented502
for the 1890s, the 1920s and the 1970/80s (Figure 10b). The year 2003 showed exceptional503
mass loss with a decrease in mean ice thickness of almost 3 meters over the nine measured504
Alpine glaciers. This rate was four times higher than the mean between 1980 and 2001 and505
exceeded the previous record of the year 1996 by almost 60% (Zemp et al., 2009).506
Glaciers in the Alps probably lost about half their total volume (roughly -0.5% per year)507
between 1850 and 1975. Roughly another 10% (20 - 25% of the remaining amount) may have508
vanished between 1975 and 2000 (updated after Haeberli et al. (2007)) and again within the509
first decade (2000 - 2009) of our century (corresponding now to about -2% per year of the510
remaining volume). The melting out of the Oetztal iceman in 1991 clearly demonstrated to511
a worldwide public that conditions in the Alps have reached if not exceeded the "warm" or512
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"energy-rich" limits of glacier and climate variability during many thousands of years before513
(Solomina et al., 2008).514
Simulations of Alpine glacier extent over the 21st century using different model approaches515
indicate unequivocally that an increase in global mean air temperature of 2◦C (corresponding516
to +3-4◦C locally) leads to an almost complete loss of glacier ice volume in the Alps (Zemp517
et al., 2006, Le Meur et al., 2007, Jouvet et al., 2009). Whereas small glaciers are expected518
to disappear in the next few decades, considerable amounts of "left-over" ice from large519
glaciers will persist throughout the 21st century due to thick ice bodies originating from520
colder conditions.521
Mountain glaciers are highly sensitive to small changes in air temperature and precipitation522
and are thus excellent indicators for climate change. Their response to currently rising air523
temperatures is strong, and is further reinforced by self-amplification processes. Many Alpine524
glaciers currently experience accelerated wastage due increased net-forcing. On the basis525
of available data a clear tipping point in the dynamic sense can not be detected. However,526
potential re-growth of Alpine glaciers would require decades of cooler and wetter conditions.527
Near-complete deglaciation of the Alps during this century could only be avoided by strong528
mitigation efforts. A global limit of two degree temperature increase might not be sufficient529
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Figure 11 Polar stratospheric clouds (PSC) Left: PSC enhance stratospheric ozone loss
(Harris et al., 2008) Right: The volume of PSC estimated from meteorological
analyses (full line ECMWF; dashed line FU Berlin) has increased in the cold
stratospheric winters, but not the warm ones (update of Rex et al. (2004)).
530
6. Arctic ozone depletion531
Potential impact on Europe Stratospheric ozone is absorbing ultra-violet (UV) solar532
radiation, especially UV-B radiation which is particularly harmful for human skin. The533
stratospheric ozone layer therefore provides protection against dermatological diseases, corneal534
and DNA damage. Ozone depletion especially above populated areas may enhance the risk of535
skin cancer and may cause immune suppression (e.g. Stick et al. (2006)). Due to the generally536
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very low UV-radiation in high latitudes a UV-increase has profound influence on society537
and ecosystems in the Arctic. The marine food chain is affected through UV-sensitivity538
of surface layer algae. Due to a very stable stratospheric polar vortex over Antarctica,539
ozone depletion in response to anthropogenic emissions has been observed in the southern540
hemisphere stratosphere for several decades. In contrast the Arctic vortex is less stable541
than over Antarctica, owing to hemispheric circulation patterns. However, for most years542
since 1992, ozone depletion has been observed also in the Arctic - locally up to 70% below543
normal [Boreal winter 1999/2000 (Rex et al., 2002)] associated with enhanced UV radiation544
in northern and central Europe. Substantial reduction in ozone levels can be observed up to545
mid-latitudes (35◦N) of southern Europe.546
1208 N. R. P. Harris et al.: Ozone trends at northern mid- and high latitudes
Fig. 1. Top: Global production of ODS. Middle: Ability of ODS
to deplete stratospheric ozone (Equivalent Effective Stratospheric
Chlorine – EESC) (solid) in comparison with a linear trend starting
in 1970 (dashed). EESC is an overall measure of chemical ozone
depletion taking into account the lifetimes and the chemical ozone
depleting potentials of the individual chemical species. Bottom:
Annual mean values of the total ozone series of Arosa (Switzer-
land) and relevant processes influencing total ozone at Northern
mid-latitudes.
vortex. However, only one trend was found when more re-
cent years are also considered, namely the tendency for cold
winters to become colder.
Keywords. Atmospheric composition and structure (Mid-
dle atmosphere – composition and chemistry) – Meteorology
and atmospheric dynamics (Middle atmosphere dynamics)
1 Introduction
The possible depletion of the ozone layer was raised in the
early 1970s (Crutzen, 1971; Johnston, 1971; Molina and
Rowland, 1974; Stolarski and Cicerone, 1974). In the mid to
late 1980s decreasing ozone amounts were observed at po-
lar and middle latitudes (Farman et al., 1985; Rowland et
al., 1988) which were related to the release of man-made
Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS) such as chlorofluoro-
carbons and Halons. Meanwhile, in response to the threat
of ozone destruction, the Vienna Convention was signed in
1985. The Montreal Protocol which limits the emissions
of ODS was signed in 1987 and has subsequently been re-
vised on six occasions. The implementation of the Montreal
Protocol, its adjustments and amendments has successfully
resulted in reduced global production of ODS (and, with a
small d lay, missions) from the end of the 1980s (Fig. 1,
top panel). I turn, this has led to a more recent decline of
the effective stratospheric chlorine loading (EESC) by about
6% since its peak in the late 1990s (Fig. 1, middle panel). In
the Arctic and Antarctic, the turnaround is later (1998–2000)
and the rate of decrease slower (Newman et al., 2006).
The world’s longest total ozone series (Arosa, Switzer-
land) shows the typical features of ozone in the Northern
mid-latitudes (Fig. 1, bottom panel). The total ozone de-
creased from the early 1970s until the mid-1990s. After the
record low ozone values in the early 1990s (related to the
eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991 (e.g. Harris et al., 1997))
total ozone at northern mid-latitudes has increased for more
than a decade. The decline up to the mid-1990s has been
commonly attributed to chemical ozone depletion caused by
the increasing concentrations of ODS. Now that the peak
in EESC has passed, it is important to know for both sci-
entific and political reasons whether the implementation of
the Montreal Protocol is effective in terms of stratospheric
ozone. However, the attribution of ozone trends to changes
in ODS emission is a difficult task because many factors con-
tribute to ozone variability and trends, in particular at mid-
latitudes. They include:
– Large volcanic eruptions;
– Arctic ozone depletion;
– Long-term climate variability;
– Changes in the stratospheric circulation; and
– Eleven year solar cycle.
Analysing the existing measurement record in order to quan-
tify how the Montreal Protocol and its amendments have af-
fected the ozone layer is thus hard and requires great care.
An improved understanding of these factors is needed to pro-
vide reliable predictions of stratospheric ozone. In particu-
lar, quantification of dynamical influences on stratospheric
ozone changes was highlighted as an outstanding issue in
ozone research, for which the level of scientific understand-
ing was quoted as medium/medium-low in WMO 2002 (Ta-
ble 4.5 in Chipperfield and Randel, 2003). This uncertainty
strongly limits the interpretation of the past evolution of the
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Projected Stratospheric chlorine (effective)
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Figure 12 Left: Time series of annual mean values of total ozone abundance in Arosa,
Switzerland (∼ 45◦N, figure from WMO (2007)). Right: Pr ject d effective
abundance of stratospheric chlorine in response to international treaties. The
observed abundance closely follows t e projected one, i.e. the line of zero-emissions
will be crossed around 2030 fter which Arctic zone ceases to be a tipping element.
Mech nism: Self-amplifying northern ozone depletion Low stratospheric temperatures support547
the formation of Polar stratospheric clouds (PSC) which generally enhance ozone548
depletion due to chemical reactions at their surface (figure 11). A strengthening of the polar549
vortex and associated lower stratospheric temperatures lead to ozone depletion which further550
cools the stratosphere (e.g. Weatherhead et al. (2004)).551
Assessment of tipping potential for Arctic ozone depletion The main driver for upper strato-552
spheric ozone loss and for spring losses in the polar stratosphere is the c emistry associated553
with chlorine and bromine (Solomon, 1999). Associated chemical reactions ar rongly554
influenced by human emissions of CFCs which have been banned with the Montreal protocol555
in 1987. As a consequence northern hemisphere total ozone in mid-latitudes has show a556
decline from late 1970s to mid 1990s (figure 12). Since then no clear trend is detectable.557
Interannual variability is particularly strong in the Arctic. This is mainly due to a558
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less stable polar vortex compared to the southern hemisphere and shows the influence559
of stratospheric dynamics on the ozone layer in the northern hemisphere. Stratospheric560
dynamics, including stability, strength and temperature of the polar vortex, determines the561
onset of ozone depletion and also influences the rate and severity of the depletion processes.562
Global warming of Earth’s surface is associated with cooling in the stratosphere which563
enhances polar ozone depletion. The accumulation of greenhouse gases in the troposphere564
(<∼10 km altitude) warms Earth’s surface but cools the stratosphere.565
In the Arctic, this cooling is likely to lead to increased ozone destruction, as lower566
temperatures result in the formation and persistence of PSCs which aid in the activation of567
ozone-depleting compounds and can therefore accelerate polar ozone depletion. The Arctic568
Climate Impact Assessment of 2004 thus drew the conclusion that such cooling may induce569
self-amplification through the stabilization of the polar vortex (Weatherhead et al., 2004).570
Stratospheric cooling resulting from climate change is therefore likely to lead to an increased571
probability of larger and longer-lasting ozone holes in the Antarctic and extensive, more572
severe ozone losses over the Arctic (Dameris et al., 1998). In an analysis of approximately573
2000 ozone-sonde measurements, Rex et al. (2004) found that each 1◦C cooling of the574
Arctic stratosphere resulted in an additional 15 DU1 of chemical ozone loss due to increased575
PSC volume. Their findings indicate that over the past four decades, the potential for the576
formation of PSCs increased by a factor of three, resulting in stratospheric conditions that577
have become significantly more favourable for large Arctic ozone losses. However, a series of578
warm, disturbed northern hemispheric stratospheric winters occurred since the late 1990s to579
2000s due to enhanced planetary wave activity (Manney et al., 2005, 2008, 2009) leading to580
a low PSC formation and hence ozone depletion potential (figure 11, right panel). Thus, a581
future projection of the Arctic ozone layer is highly uncertain due to the large interannual582
variability observed in boreal winter (WMO, 2007).583
The situation is further complicated through other radiative effects that influence the584
ozone budget of the stratosphere. One is a potential increase in stratospheric water vapour585
due to changes in tropopause temperatures (Evans et al., 1998). Increased water vapour is586
likely to contribute to increased ozone destruction by affecting the radiation balance of the587
stratosphere (Forster & Shine, 2002, Shindell, 2001). Greater water vapour concentrations in588
the stratosphere can raise the threshold temperatures for activating heterogeneous chemical589
reactions on PSCs, and can cause a decrease in the temperature of the polar vortex (Kirk-590
Davidoff et al., 1999). Few long-term datasets of water vapour concentrations are available,591
but previous studies of existing observations have suggested that stratospheric water vapour592
has been increasing up to 1999 (Oltmans & Hofmann, 1995). Analyses of 45 years of data593
(1954-2000) by Rosenlof et al. (2001) found a 1% per year increase in stratospheric water594
vapour concentrations. Since 1999 there is no evidence for an increasing trend (Jones et al.,595
2009, Randel et al., 2004) while an overall decrease is observed which feeds back onto the596
1 DU=Dobson unit measures atmospheric ozone content. 1 DU corresponds to 0.01mm ozone layer thickness
under standard conditions of 0◦C and 1 atm. pressure.
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tropospheric temperatures temporarily decelerating the global warming trend (Solomon597
et al., 2010).598
On the other hand, climate change could possibly trigger an increase in planetary waves,599
enhancing the transport of warm, ozone-rich air to the Arctic (Schnadt et al., 2002). This600
increased transport would counter the effects of heterogeneous chemistry and possibly601
accelerate recovery of the ozone layer. Recently Tegtmeier et al. (2008) showed that dynamical602
transport of ozone into the Arctic polar vortex in the past has contributed equally strong603
to interannual variability as variations in chemical ozone loss. It is currently not possible604
to make definite statements about the tipping point in the chemical destruction of Arctic605
ozone. If the emission of ozone-reducing chemicals is reduced in the future following the606
signed treaties, then the specific risk of a tipping of the Arctic ozone will become insignificant607
between 2030 and 2060 (figure 12). After that, unabated global warming, however, may lead608
to qualitative changes in atmospheric circulation patterns associated with the polar vortex.609
Since the lower stratospheric wintertime circulation can strongly influence the probability610
of extreme surface weather such as minimum daily temperatures in Europe (Scaife et al.,611
2008), these circulation pattern changes have the potential to exhibit tipping-element-like612
behaviour in a statistical sense.613
7. Conclusions614
An assessment of the likelihood of a major transition of different tipping elements is as615
scientifically challenging as it is crucial for future societal, political and economic decisions.616
Such assessment needs to be based on a thorough understanding of the systems in question617
and might evolve while scientific insight deepens. In light of associated risks even incomplete618
knowledge needs to be exploited to provide ’educated guesses’ on the basis of available619
information. Such assessment will, by definition, always be preliminary and will permanently620
evolve. In light of natural climate variability, even the detection of the ongoing tipping of621
a climatic system presents a scientific challenge. Time series of relevant observables rarely622
exceed several decades in length which might not be sufficient to identify an acceleration623
in the system beyond any doubt. There are, however, a number of universal precursors624
such as enhanced variability when approaching a critical threshold which might be used for625
monitoring systems (Scheffer et al., 2009). This potential has neither been explored nor626
applied to the largest possible extent.627
Linkages between tipping elements Matters are further complicated by the fact that some628
tipping elements are linked (Figure 14). For example, increased sea level by GIS melting will629
elevate ice shelves in Antarctica and might thereby induce a retreat of the grounding line.630
Most linkages, however, involve the Atlantic thermohaline circulation. A collapse or even631
only a reduction of its meridional circulation component will cool northern high latitudes632
which might stabilize melting of the GIS and Arctic sea-ice even though the cooling effect633
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Fig. 1 reveals that the experts’ ambiguity about the probability of
triggering a tipping point (as measured by the distance between
their lower and upper probability assignments) is large. One-third
of all estimates (38% of estimates from core experts) cover at least
half the range of the unit probability interval, and several of them
express near ignorance. In addition, expert intervals scatter widely.
Nonetheless, there is a considerable amount of information con-
tained in the expert assessments. The prospect of triggering a
tipping point may be considered ‘‘remote’’ if the upper probability
P*(B) 0.1. It may be labeled ‘‘significant’’ if the lower probability
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Fig. 1. Probability intervals from experts for the events CMOC,MGIS, DAIS, AMAZ, and NINO (see Table 1) conditional on 3 different corridors for future global
mean temperature (GMT) increase to 2200 (relative to year 2000 temperatures, see top row). The presentation of expert opinions has been anonymized by
numbering a random permutation of experts (shown below each panel). Labels are tipping point specific as indicated by the preceding letters C, M, D, A, and
N. The self-assessment of experts is shown above each panel. Probability estimates of core experts (see text for an explanation) are depicted in black, and the
remaining estimates are shown in gray. The rightmost bar in each panel shows the aggregation of probability intervals from core experts based on increasingly
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Figure 13 Subjective probabilities provided by experts for the tipping of THC (denoted
CMOC), GIS (denoted MGIS) and WAIS (denoted DAIS). The x-axis provides the
number of the expert. Coloured bars represent a core group of experts for each
tipping element which are actively publishing on the subject. The upper panel row
provides the corresponding climate scenarios as represented by the evolution of the
global mean temperature (GMT) during the 21st and 22nd century. High emission
scenarios (right panels) yield probabilities predominately above 50% for each system
and even for low warming scenarios (left panels) the elicited tipping potentials are
not negligible. The rightmost bar in each panel shows the aggregation of probability
intervals from core experts based on increasingly restrictive assumptions about
expert weights: (i) weights are allowed to vary by ±100% (green) or ±50% (yellow)
around uniform weights, and (ii) unweighted average of lower and upper bounds
(red). The increasing strength of assumptions leads to nested probability intervals
(Red < Yellow < Green). For details confer (Kriegler et al., 2009).
will b stronge t in winter while the melting occurs in summer. On the o her hand GIS634
melting will freshen t e Nort Atlantic and might thereby trigger a THC break-down. The635
resultant changes in tropospheric circulation and weather will be modulated by the lower636
25
stratospheric circulation. Strong reduction in Arctic sea ice will change the salinity and heat637
budget of the Nordic Seas and thereby influence the Atlantic ocean circulation (Levermann638
et al., 2007). Less sea ice cover will induce enhanced warming in high northern latitudes639
and increase melting on Greenland and even in the Alps. In the Southern Ocean a THC640
reduction will lead to a warming around Antartica. Furthermore it might shift the subpolar641
wind belt (Vellinga & Wood, 2002), alter oceanic gyre circulation around Antartica and642
thereby induce changes in ice shelf melting (Hattermann & Levermann, 2010) and influence643
the stability properties of WAIS. Though these connections exist, so far neither model results644
nor paleo evidence has clearly shown the tipping of one of these systems due to the tipping645
of another.Interactions between tipping events
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Figure 14 Potential linkages between tipping elements.
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Tipping elements and their transition potential The most recent comprehensive assessment of647
a number of tipping elements and their linkage was presented by Kriegler et al. (2009). They648
conducted an expert elicitation on subjective probabilities for the tipping under different649
future warming scenarios (figure 13). Results show that experts consider the risk of tipping650
of major climatic subsystems significant. This holds especially for high warming scenarios651
but numbers are still far from small for a moderate temperature increase within this century.652
Here we provide a condensed assessment of the potential of a transition to occur in each of653
the subsystems in figure 15. Tipping elements are sorted according to the severity of their654
impact on society. The color coding represents ’tipping potential’ for different global mean655
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temperature increase. The width of the columns reflects the confidence that the authors have656
in their assessment. Naturally confidence is relatively high that no transition has occurred657
for present-day conditions even though we can not be entirely certain about this. For most658
systems confidence in the assessment that a transition will occur increases with increasing659
levels of global warming. A special case is the collapse of the THC. Here a qualitative change660
in the circulation is induced through changes in the North Atlantic salinity distribution661
which is only indirectly related to increasing temperature through GIS melting and changes662
in precipitation. Confidence about the likelihood of a collapse thus remains low even for663
high temperatures.664
The WAIS bears the potential of abrupt solid ice discharge in response to oceanic warming,665
but currently no direct temperature estimates for such tipping is available. Paleo climatic666
evidence (Naish et al., 2009) in combination with land ice dynamics simulations (Pollard667
& Deconto, 2009) suggest that abrupt discharge has occurred at temperatures 1-2◦C above668
present. It should be noted that also a partial WAIS disintegration is possible. Satellite669
observations show strong glacier thinning and a retreat of the grounding line in some regions670
(Pritchard et al., 2009). At present it can not be ruled out that a partial collapse of671
WAIS within the Amundson Sea sector equivalent to 1.5 m SLR might have been initiated672
(Joughin et al., 2009, Chen et al., 2009, Pritchard et al., 2009). The stability of the GIS has673
been investigated more intensely than WAIS stability. Available estimates of the threshold674
temperature for GIS of 3.1 ± 0.8◦C (section 2) might however not be robust since they675
are based on simplified parameterizations of the surface mass balance. Our current level676
of understanding suggests that Arctic sea ice and Alpine mountain glaciers are the most677
vulnerable to global warming of the presented short list of tipping elements even though678
currently self-acceleration in a dynamical sense can not be detected. It is possible that even679
mitigated climate change, which does not exceed 2◦C of global warming, is not sufficient680
to avoid qualitative change of these glacial regions. The risk of a tipping point in Arctic681
ozone depletion will become insignificant when chlorine levels drop below 1980 levels which682
will occur by 2060. Since it is very unlikely that global warming will exceed 4◦C by 2060 no683
assessment for higher temperatures is provided.684
The schematic of figure 15 is based on the scientific evidence presented in this paper. The685
assessment is, however, necessarily subjective and might change with future studies. Impact686
associated with the tipping of each of the presented systems are of continental or even global687
scale.688
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Figure 15 ’Burning rivers’ summarizing the authors’ general assessment of the potential
of a transition of each system into a state that differs qualitatively from their
present state. Colour coding represents the authors assessment of the likelihood
of a transition for different global temperature increase. The width of the column
represents the authors’ confidence in their assessment, i.e. the narrower the ’river’
the less confident the experts are in their respective assessment. For most systems
the risk of tipping increases with temperature along with the confidence in such
an assessment. An exception is the potential collapse of the Atlantic overturning
circulation. Such a transition depends on the freshwater inflow into the North
Atlantic which is only indirectly related to the global mean temperature increase
through Greenland melting and precipitation changes. Especially because of
uncertainty with respect to future precipitation changes, confidence in the tipping
potential for the THC does not increase with temperature. The risk of reaching
a tipping point in Arctic ozone depletion will become insignificant when chlorine
levels drop below 1980 levels which is projected to occur around 2060 (WMO,
2007, SPARC, 2010). In the specific case of ozone depletion there exist significant
uncertainty on the nature of the state to which the atmospheric circulation might to.
All other systems are cryospheric and thus the likelihood of a transition increases
with temperature. Due to the possibility that a partial disintegration of the WAIS
in the Amundson Sea sector might have been already initiated the corresponding
confidence that no transition has occurred for zero temperature increase is slightly
reduced.
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